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ABSTRACT 
Eaton created a new safety controller architecture to allow our customers to design implement, verify 
and maintain a SIL-2 safety certified application for compliance with IEC 61508:2010 and ISO 13849 
Functional Safety Standards.  
The new architecture has been implemented in a line of safety controllers SFX12 and SFX20 that 
extend the line of existing mobile controllers HFX12 to HFX48. The new controllers are targeted for 
controlling mobile and stationary machine applications with focus on steer by wire and propel by wire.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Functional Safety for mobile machinery is a new 
challenge for machine OEMs that are integrating 
hydraulics with electronic control systems. 
Several standards have emerged that can be used 
to prove compliance to the machinery directive 
by the European Union.  
In this document we will outline a path to 
certify a mobile machine for functional safety 
2. THE PROCESS TO A CERITIFIED SIL2 
SAFETY APPLICATION 
2.1. Overview over safety standards 
By signing the Machinery Directive into law, the 
European union mandated that products must be 
assessed for safety. The overarching standard for 
functional safety is IEC 61508 for electric, 
electronic and programmable electronic systems.  
It defines in detail how to design verify and 
validate an E/E/EP system and defines four SIL, 
safety integrity levels. ISO 13849 focuses on 
machinery safety and includes guidance for the 
Figure 1: Overview Safety Standards 
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mechanical part of the machinery in addition to 
the electronic control. IEC 62061 and ISO 26262 
apply the safety aspects to industrial application 
and automotive applications (Figure 1). 
ISO 19014 Earth moving machines, ISO 5010 
Wheel loaders, ISO 25119 Tractors, ISO 3691 
Industrial trucks and others are application 
standards for specific groups of machines. If you 
are creating a safety application for a machine 
where an application standard exists, that 
standard will contain the most detailed 
information, since the operating conditions of the 
machines are known. 
2.2. Steps to functional safety compliance 
Select a safety standard 
The machine builder/ OEM is responsible for 
selecting the safety standard to apply. Each 
standard has named their safety levels differently 
and associates different requirements to these 
levels. Once selected, the Hazard and Risk 
analysis will determine which safety level needs 
to be achieved in that standard.  
Create a Hazard and Risk analysis (HARA) 
The HARA is a formal process to list, classify, 
assess and rank the risks and hazard in the system. 
The standard ISO 12100 gives guidance and a 
basic framework to conduct the HARA.  
define the safety function AND SAFE STATE 
The risk in the safety related part of the control 
system that needs to be reduced according to the 
HARA will be supervised by the Safety Function. 
Creating a FMEA (failure mode and effect 
analysis) will create the necessary input for the 
requirements and creates data for the diagnostic 
coverage. The safety function will be able to 
detect a hazardous state and put the system into 
the safe state.  
The standards have design criteria that specify 
safety functions and safe states that must be met. 
An important part of the verification and 
validation process is to prove the correct 
execution of these functions. 
Define and verify safety requirements 
Safety standards require a formalized process to 
manage requirements through out the life cycle of 
the product.  
The V model (Figure 2) is always referenced 
when higher level system requirements are 
decomposed in to lower level software and 
hardware requirements. Part of the planning 
process is to create test procedures that will be 
executed during the verification and validation 
phase. 
Figure 2: V Model for System Verification and Validation 
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Design and implement functional safety 
In the development process, the individual 
requirement elements will be realized. Hardware 
will be designed or purchased, software will be 
written, and the system will be built. 
Verify and Validate functional safety 
Verification and validation will prove that the 
system requirements are implemented and 
perform as expected. It is important that each 
requirement is covered with an appropriate test 
case, and no requirements will be missed. Testing 
needs to be well documented and serves as proof 
to the certification agency. 
Operation and Support 
The functional safety standard requires the 
machine builder to have processes in place for 
operation, production and long-term support. The 
product needs to have a complete life cycle 
support. 
3. THE EATON SFX CONTROLLER 
The SFX product is certified for functional safety 
and is a version of the Eaton HFX mobile 
controller family. The HFX product line is a 
mobile controller with typical inputs and outputs 
that are needed in mobile machinery. They are 
designed to drive hydraulic proportional valves 
and interface with a variety of sensors, digital and 
analog.  
Connectivity is provided via CANbus ports 
using the SAE J1939 or CANopen standards. 
Figure 3: SFX Controller 
Figure 4: Safety Controller Architecture 
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Two sizes with four versions of programmable IO 
configurations, from 6 inputs and 6 outputs to 24 
inputs and 24 outputs allow fitting the controller 
perfectly to the machine application.  
Software programming in the application 
domain can be done in C with an extensive C-API 
library, MATLAB / Simulink or any of the IEC 
61113-3 languages. 
In addition to the standard HFX application 
controller with the I/O functions, the SFX version 
contains a separate safety CPU (Figure 3). The 
safety CPU monitors all inputs and outputs 
independent of the application CPU to allow for 
the implementation of application-specific safety 
functions that are physically isolated in the safety 
domain (Figure 3). The safety domain provides 
greater than 90% fault detection coverage.  
This includes supervision of all internal 
voltages and servicing a hardware watchdog 
timer. The lockstep core ensures very low FIT 
numbers for the processor chip. 
3.1. Channel Structure 
The safety CPU is connected to the sensor input. 
(Figure 5). It will read the voltage directly from 
the pin and has its own sensor conditioning. If 
there is a fault in the sensor input conditioning of 
the Main CPU in the application channel, it does 
not affect the reading of the safety CPU. With the 
knowledge of the connected sensor in the 
application it can decide if the application is safe. 
The safety CPU queries the application CPU 
about the type of sensor connected, to interpret 
Figure 6: SFX software architecture block diagram 
Figure 5: 1001 Channel architecture according to 
IEC61508 
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the pin voltage correctly. In case the safety CPU 
detects a faulty sensor, it can open the safety relay 
that will then disable the output driver of the main 
CPU. That way it can prevent the application to 
operate with a faulty sensor and put the system 
into a dangerous state. 
3.2. Safety function 
The safety CPU will execute the user written 
application specific safety functions that will 
supervise the machine operation. In a fault 
condition the safety function will deactivate a 
safety relay that will remove power to all outputs. 
This will remove power from all actuators and 
valves that will then move into their fail-safe 
position. 
3.3. Software architecture 
The software architecture block diagram is 
shown in Figure 6, illustrating the software 
modules.   
In the application domain, the core software 
contains all low-level drivers to service the 
hardware, general real time operating system 
functions (RTOS) and the communication 
interfaces. These elements are provided by Eaton. 
The main domain application software is created 
by the machine builder / OEM and contains the 
functions that the machine will execute. Since the 
main domain application is separated from the 
safety domain, this software does not have to 
meet the requirements from the safety standard.  
For example, once the product is released and the 
safety software is certified, changes in the 
application software will not affect the safety 
certificate.   
In the safety domain, the core software 
provided by Eaton is SIL 2 compliant. The RTOS 
is a commercial of the shelf operating system 
(SAFERTOS) that is pre-certified by the vendor. 
All the code development is done with a SIL 
certified compiler (Greenhills C). A verification 
and validation model is executed (Figure 2), and 
the code quality was assessed with static and 
dynamic verification tools such as MISRA, 
Polyspace bug finder and other code analysis 
methods for timing, complexity and memory 
utilisation. 
4. THE PRODUCT DESIGN PROCESS 
This chapter will layout the process to design 
a system that requires functional safety. From the 
overall functionality of the machine, the safety 
critical functions need to be isolated. ISO 18349 
calls them SRP/CS, Safety Related Part of the 
Control System. The hazard analysis of the 
system will guide through that process and 
identity if a SIL2 system is necessary.  
For example, if the system is a truck mounted 
crane with a hydraulic actuator and an electronic 
control, then the SRP/CS is the cylinder actuation 
of the boom of the crane. 
The next step is to identify the safe state the 
system needs go into in case of a failure. On a 
hydraulic system the safe state can be zero output 
flow from the hydraulic valve and no movement 
of the boom cylinder. In the example the hazard 
analysis determined a SIL2 system to be 
necessary. The function is a type B, high demand. 
Since the system has no fault tolerance, the safety 
failure fraction of the system needs to be 90% to 
99%, the PFD below 10e-6 hours.  
The safety function will be able to ensure that 
the SRP/CS executes correctly, that there are no 
faults and the actuator response is in accordance 
with the command input. The safety controller 
supervises the hydraulic system and will detect 
unintended cylinder motion. The safety controller 
will shut down the hydraulic valve via a 
mechanism (electronic power off or external 
hydraulic shut down) within a specified time, for 
example 0.2 seconds. It is verified by the user of 
the machine that when the safety function brings 
the system into the safe state within that specified 
time that the hazard has been avoided. In the 
verification and validation process test cases will 
be created that verify that the specified time can 
be achieved by the functionally safe system. 
Creating of safety software 
Application-specific safety functions monitor 
commands, cylinder motion and decide if 
unintended motion is occurring and activates the 
safety function.  Since the main application and 
safety software on the SFX controller run in 
different domains on different processors, the 
safety software does not need to include 
application code. This simplifies the creation and 
verification of the software and reduces the 
design cycle time and effort. The safety software 
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will be more robust and will require no changes 
when the application software is modified.  
verify the metrics 
With the system completed, the actual SFF (safe 
failure fraction), MTBFd (mean time to 
dangerous failure), DC (diagnostic coverage) for 
the system can be calculated. The results for the 
SFX controller are provided by Eaton. 
Verification and validation tools shall be 
applied to the safety software to satisfy the 
requirements of IEC61508. Test cases on the 
complete system that verify safety function, shall 
be executed. 
Document results 
An important part of safety system design is to 
create good and detailed documentation from 
requirements to test results. Good requirements 
management tools ensure valid documentation 
through the product life cycle. The 
documentation is critical for the approval process 
from the certification agency. 
Creating safety manual 
The documentation created during the design 
process are internal documents. Customer facing 
documents are catalogs, operation and instruction 
manual and most importantly the safety manual.  
The safety manual gives the OEM detailed 
instructions under what conditions the safety 
integrity level is achieved.  
5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
The newly designed SFX controllers will help 
more easily to introduce functional safety 
compliant machinery into the market with their 
unique safety architecture. This architecture is 
important because it allows changes to the 
application to be made later without having to re-
certify the entire system.   
NOMENCLATURE 
SIL   Safety Integrity Level 
SFF   Safe Failure Fraction 
MTBFd Mean Time to dangerous Failure 
DC  Diagnostic Coverage 
SRP/CS Safety Related Part of the Control System 
PFD  Probability of dangerous failure per hour 
RTOS Real Time Operating System 
OEM Original Equipment Manufactuer 
HARA Hazard and Risk Analysis 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
HFX Eaton Hydraulics Controller 
SFX  Eaton Safety Controller 
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